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Critical Practices in Organizations 
Abstract 
This paper deals with the phenomenon of criticism in organizations. Existing organizational 
literature, where it has addressed criticism, mostly tends to see it as an extraordinary 
phenomenon. By contrast, in this paper we argue that criticism may also originate from 
strongly embedded and more ordinary practices. Thus, there is a theoretical need for 
considering those critical practices which are structurally and/or formally institutionalized 
within the organization. They reflect the organizational status quo and tend to promote a 
reproduction of existing structures of power/knowledge. Drawing upon ideas from practice 
theory, institutional theory, and Foucault’s analytics of power/knowledge regimes, we 
introduce a typology which distinguishes forms of criticism according to the degree to which 
they are coupled with particular organizational practices, their rationalities and corresponding 
power relations. We then focus on those forms of criticism which are strongly linked to 
organizational practices (‘critical meta-practices’) and illustrate the ambiguous effects of such 
an ‘organization of criticism’.  
Keywords: Criticism, practice theory, Foucault, institutionalization, power/knowledge   
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Introduction 
Research has repeatedly stressed the importance of critical reflection and critical discourse in 
the management of organizations, particularly in the literature on organisational knowledge 
and learning, where critique tends to be regarded as a main trigger for learning processes (e.g. 
Argyris and Schön 1996; Nyström and Starbuck 1984; Preskill and Torres 1999). While these 
contributions are usually framed within a ‘managerialist perspective’, which tends to regard 
criticism as a means to improve organizational performance, a different stream of thought 
focuses on more subversive forms of criticism in organizations.  
In the tradition of Critical Management Studies (CMS), researchers have studied 
criticism as a form of resistance or protest against fundamental managerial goals and values 
(see Alvesson and Willmott 1996). Examples include the reflexive construction of versions of 
the self (Bruner, 1990), the diffusion of rumours and whistle-blowing (Jermier et al. 1994), 
the use of irony (Trethewey 1997), scepticism (Fleming and Sewell 2002), and cynicism 
(Fleming and Spicer 2003). From these critical perspectives criticism is not only a refined art 
but one that is widely practised. 
Despite the major differences between managerialist and critical accounts, both see 
criticism as being something exceptional rather than routine, as something which occurs 
outside of organizational routines. Managerially, criticism has an instrumental purpose: it 
enables an organization to break with routine practice to better achieve organizational goals; 
for the CMS community critique is a timely effort by members to assert and differentiate their 
self from fundamental organizational values and power systems. In both cases, criticism is 
framed as exceptional rather than as being embedded in organizational routines.  
There is a category of criticism somewhat neglected by both perspectives – those 
critical actions that emerge rather routinely within the organization. These critical practices 
may either be structurally and formally institutionalized as a form of meta-practice or they 
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may be the result of the enactment of an established rationality within the organization. As a 
consequence, such criticism cannot be regarded as exceptional or extraordinary. Rather, it is 
part of the organizational status quo and, as such, is supported by institutionalized rationalities 
and power systems.  
Our interest in criticism may be termed ‘pragmatic’ because it treats critique as a 
particular regime of action to be studied descriptively rather than viewing it normatively as a 
good or bad thing (see Bénatouïl 1999); thus, we are neither ‘for’ nor ‘against’ critique but 
interested in its ambiguous effects. In brief, critique is ambiguous because it can both open up 
and close down organization practices and discourses. Critique may be a driver of new 
organizational practices and trigger institutional change, such as when social movements 
challenge the dominant logic of organizational behaviour (Schneiberg and Lounsbury, 
forthcoming). The more powerful it is, however, the more easily critique may turn into a form 
of discipline and domination, subjecting other practices to continuous critical scrutiny (e.g. 
Townley 1993b; Hopper and Macintosh 1998), or even degenerating into a ceremonial 
practice in which criticism assumes a ritual quality (Meyer and Rowan 1977).  When criticism 
becomes a routine which constantly constrains actions that might otherwise have been 
attempted, it may no longer be ‘functional, useful, and a generally good thing’ (Alvesson and 
Kärreman 2001: 999-1000). The ‘rhetoric of critique’ may, in other words, mask the uncritical 
nature of an alleged critical practice.  
In the following, we shall first lay out the foundations for a pragmatic approach to 
criticism. In the second part of the paper, we discuss forms of criticism in organizations and 
the ambiguous effects that an organization of critique can bring about. Concluding our paper, 
we will highlight the implications of our analysis for further research.  
 
Critique and practice 
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Critique 
The notion of ‘critique’ implies at least two common meanings for organization researchers. 
In everyday discussions, people typically criticise to indicate that some alternative would be 
preferable or that the activity or practice in question could have been performed more 
desirably. Generally, and colloquially, we speak of criticism when we refer to a judgment or 
evaluation that focuses on some, usually negative, aspects of the object or practice being 
criticised. Second, there is a ‘scientific’ notion of critique that refers to the practice of 
theoretical investigation into a subject area as carried out by critical scholars. Generally 
speaking, such a critique is considered to be ‘critical’ to the extent that it is both more 
informed than lay actors’ everyday judgments and actions and more reflexive about those lay 
actors’ accounts as they are available in mundane reality.  
While research may study forms of everyday criticism from various disciplinary 
perspectives, such as psychology, sociology, or linguistics, there is a more specialized general 
social theory perspective, associated in particular with Jürgen Habermas’ attempts to 
reconstruct the critical capacity of lay actors. In his Theory of Communicative Action, 
Habermas uses speech-act-theory to illustrate how actors justify and criticise the validity 
claims that are raised in symbolic actions (Habermas 1995a, 1995b). He does so using a 
theory of action and rationality that draws, in part, on academic traditions of critique, as well 
as lending support to an ordinary language conception of criticism. He thereby distinguishes 
between theoretical, practical, aesthetic and expressive critical statements, depending on the 
type of validity claim being questioned. Habermas situates his pragmatic sociology as a 
normative project, making a plea for an ideal speech situation in which communication is not 
distorted by system imperatives, normatively grounding his projects as a critical theory rather 
than a theory of critical practices per se. Habermas (1995a: 48) argues that, in discourses, 
 6 
speakers ideally are relieved from the pressures of their life world background and are 
therefore unconstrained in formulating and raising criticisms.  
Similar, but somewhat more pragmatic (see Bénatouïl 1999), is the approach taken by 
a group of French sociologists clustering around Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot (1991, 
1999). While Habermas claims that rationality emerges as a result of a consensus among 
discourse participants, Boltanski and Thévenot stress the differences in the rationalities that 
actors bring to disputes. They distinguish between several ‘regimes of justification’, each of 
them representing a different criterion against which circumstances, actions, statements, or 
other practices can be judged. The authors show that these logics are regularly applied in 
everyday disputes and suggest that criticism can be understood as the mobilization of one 
regime of justification (rationality) against another, while taking an agnostic stance towards 
the critical instruments. Boltanski and Thévenot (1999: 373) do not allude to structural 
constraints that may have an impact on the way criticism is exercised. They argue that actors 
can resort to different regimes of justification but they do not examine the unequal access of 
individuals to these regimes (Bénatouïl 1999). However, as is evident, ‘far from being 
completely free and flexible, individuals can only choose from the ultimately limited pool of 
regimes of criticism and justification that happen to have been made available to them’ (Silber 
2003: 430). In other words, criticism is a practice that will be constrained (and enabled) by the 
structural features upon which its proponents draw, most notably by the knowledge they 
possess.  
In order to understand the origins and effects of critical practices, it is important to 
consider them as linked to competing modes of rationality which are, in turn, embedded in 
institutional fields. The notion of modes of rationality was developed by Clegg (1975) in  a 
structural model to characterize the different forms of deep structure that could underlay the 
everyday production of organizational discourse. As Lounsbury (2007: 289) has argued 
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“multiple forms of rationality provide a foundation for ongoing struggle and change in 
organizational fields.” (See also Lounsbury and Crumley, forthcoming). In other words, 
criticism is a practice that will always be constrained (and enabled) by the structural features 
upon which its proponents draw, most notably the knowledge they possess which makes 
possible the discursive moves that they make. 
 
Practice  
The risk with structural accounts of competing rationalities is that they can be somewhat 
determinist: the rationalities determine the discursive moves of the actors. Recently developed 
theory, with its roots in older schools such as ethnomethodology, seeks to resolve this issue. 
At the centre of practice theories (see Schatzki et al. 2001) is a concern with overcoming a 
dualism between structuralist argumentation on the one hand, in which agency tends to get 
short shrift and, on the other, an individualistic action theory, where structures rarely intrude. 
The category of social practices is introduced to transform the dualism of structure and 
agency into a duality, such that ‘the structural properties of social systems are both the 
medium and the outcome of the practices that constitute those systems’ (Giddens 1979: 69). 
The focus on practices alerts us to what it is that is done, how it is done, as well as 
how it is possible that it be done. Practices can be defined as ‘regularized types of acts’ 
(Giddens 1976: 75) and thus as ‘routinized way[s] in which bodies are moved, objects are 
handled, subjects are treated, things are described and the world is understood’ (Reckwitz 
2002: 250). Practice theories hold that agency is always bound to sets of available practices 
with which actors make sense, and thus to the structural features of the social system, 
composed of a set of situated social practices, possible vocabularies of motive, and members’ 
categorization devices for interpreting them (Dupuy et al. 1989; Gomez and Jones 2000; 
Sacks 1991).  
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Many practice theories stress the ‘iterative dimension’ of social action (see Emirbayer 
and Mische 1998). Bourdieu (1977), for example, uses the notion of habitus to capture this 
iterative dimension, which refers to the formative influence of the past on present action. 
Giddens (1984), in turn, associates the routine character of social action with the implicit 
pursuit of ontological security that he sees as characteristic of human agents. Both Bourdieu 
and Giddens emphasize the habitual and taken-for-granted nature of social life and suggest 
that it is ‘normal’ and existentially important for actors to follow routines. Recurrent practices 
are one way of routinizing the life world.  
It is the particular merit of Foucault to have revealed the contingency of some of the 
dominant practices and systems of thought in our society, seen as the specific ‘orders of 
things’ (Foucault 2002) or ‘orders of discourse’ (Foucault 1987) that prevail in particular 
discursive arenas, and to have raised awareness of the power effects of such systems. In his 
historical analyses of the asylum, the clinic, the prison, and sexuality, Foucault illustrates how 
particular ‘regimes of truth’ become acceptable at a given historical moment, as they are 
supported by a set of technologies and practices that ‘create’ this ‘truth’. Power and 
knowledge operate in a mutually generative fashion, as ‘nothing can exist as an element of 
knowledge if ... it does not possess the effects of coercion’ and because ‘nothing can function 
as a mechanism of power if it is not deployed according to procedures, instruments, means, 
and objectives which can be validated in more or less coherent systems of knowledge’ 
(Foucault 1997a: 52). The notion of practice plays a crucial role in the relation between power 
and knowledge: practice represents the interface, the link between knowledge and power. 
Practice is where a certain way of doing things and a certain mode of acquiring knowledge 
collide. Individual actors both reproduce and change practices through their specific 
interpretations and situational enactments (Feldman and Pentland 2003; Lounsbury and 
Crumley, forthcoming). Hence, knowingly or not, skilled actors innovate as they enact and 
appropriate practices in their everyday organizational contexts 
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Following Giddens (1984: 200), we can understand organizations as places where the 
continuity of day-to-day practices is reflexively regulated, i.e. the reproduction of the 
organization’s structure is actively monitored and intentionally influenced (also see Ranson et 
al. 1980; Whittington 1992; Jarzabkowski 2004). Organizations use meta-practices to reflect 
on and change existing practices and to develop innovative practices (Adler et al. 1999). 
These meta-practices are thus a primary means of reflexive structuration, as defined by 
Giddens (1984). Reflexive structuration practices tend to be institutionally specific and 
specialized in organizations, exhibited in practices such as those of general management, 
financial control, or personnel evaluation, which can be considered meta-practices, since they 
both reflect on and refer to other practices rather than being self-sufficient. Institutionally, 
while they critically question other practices in the organizational domain they are, at the 
same time, committed to the systems of rationality and power relations that support their 
functioning.  
Foucault, who was not an organization theorist but a historian of ideas used familiar 
ideas from statecraft to capture such practices of reflexive structuration, which he referred to 
as forms of ‘government’, i.e. as strategies used ‘to structure the field of possible action’ 
(Foucault 1982: 221). Government, in the general sense in which Foucault uses it, is not 
confined just to what states do but can include many other organizations, such as schools or 
the family. The focus is on the institutional exercise of power and the creation of ‘truth’, 
which works on both the levels of practices and of discourses. Government addresses 
practices through systematic forms of rule, such as timetables in schools, the creation of a 
curriculum which is a routinized product rather than the effect of individual choices. 
Discourse is addressed through the shaping and prioritizing of appropriate ‘mentalities’.  For 
instance, British schools developed a canon of literature that framed the curriculum. Foucault 
saw the idea as born of a radical realignment of the disciplines of knowledge that created 
'literature' as a definite category, indeed as an institutional ordering embedded in devices such 
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as distinct curricula that can be subject to critique (Hunter 1988).  Critical practices are thus 
those discursive practices that subject other practices to critical scrutiny in order to govern 
them. While such criticism might be only loosely coupled to established organizational 
practices, it might also be structurally and formally institutionalized as a meta-practice. 
 
Critical practices in organizations 
Many authors have pointed to the importance of critical reflection as a trigger for 
knowledge creation and learning (e.g. Preskill and Torres 1999; Reynolds 1998). A critical 
attitude towards established routines and ways of thinking has been regarded as crucial for 
achieving the state of a ‘learning organization’ because, as Brown and Starkey (2000: 111) 
argue, ‘without contention there is no internal stimulus for change’. With few other 
exceptions in the learning literature, among which are Coopey (1995), Blackler and 
McDonald (2000), and Vince (2001), power/politics have not been central to analysis. Vince 
(2001), in particular, illustrates how established power relations and emotional ties limit 
learning and change at an organizational level. The connection between emotions and power 
that resulted from processes of organizing and that, over time, acted as a limitation to 
fundamental learning and innovation, created what Vince refers to as the ‘establishment’. In 
the case in question the establishment was highly impervious to criticism coming from people 
who are not recognizably members of it, displayed in terms of their emotional style, social 
and cultural capital. Where criticism is closely coupled to existing sets of knowledge and 
power relations, then it might actually reproduce such an ‘establishment’ rather than open up 
the organization for new knowledge and opportunities.  
Where established ways of thinking and acting are challenged critical reflection can 
provide for a certain dynamic within organizations that brings about a ‘new quality’ of 
learning. From this perspective critique does not encourage consolidation and confirmation of 
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existing knowledge so much as opening the organization, or even entire institutional fields, up 
to new perceptions and actions, which Hedberg (1981: 18) refers to as ‘unlearning’: ‘a process 
through which learners discard knowledge’ making way ‘for new responses and mental 
maps’. Unlearning is often triggered by problems or crises that force the organization to 
question established routines (Hedberg 1981: 19; also see Kiernan 1993). Organizations can 
stimulate processes of unlearning by listening to dissent, complaints and warnings, by 
introducing new perceptions and experimenting with existing practices (Nyström and 
Starbuck 1984; March et al. 1991; also see Argyris and Schön 1996). 
The social actors that drive unlearning can be many and varied, ranging from the top 
management team that wishes to change direction; consultants, who have a new process to 
instigate; customers, from whom new desires are learnt; collaborating partners, who bring 
new routines and ways of doing things into the organization’s orbit; influential commentators 
in the public sphere, such as media representatives; regulatory authorities and standards 
bodies that mandate institutional isomorphism with ways of doing things not yet adopted; 
social movements that criticise and challenge dominant practices, and, finally, employees, 
who may avail themselves of specific quality circle practices or suggestion schemes. All of 
these actors are capable of making a difference to what organizations do by exercising their 
ability to be critical of existing practices. While such critical efforts may help the organization 
unlearn existing habits they need to be investigated with respect to the contingency of their 
own knowledge and power supports.  
The rationales in which criticism is embedded deserve to be subjected to critical 
scrutiny. For instance, the critical intervention of consultants are sometimes built upon some 
stereotypical meta-narrative about how organizations should be run, rather than on a 
contextually detailed concern with the specific situation of a particular organization (see 
Berglund and Werr 2000; Sorge and van Witteloostuijn 2004). Similarly, when top managers 
raise their critical voice, there is always the risk that it is their hierarchical authority that 
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weighs heavier in persuading others to accept their views than the specific contents of their 
proposals. Thus, it is important to capture the degree to which particular critical actions rely 
on the rationality and power support of specific organizational practices.  
Generally speaking, we argue that the tighter criticism is coupled to an established 
practice, the more sceptical one needs to be with respect to the ‘quality’ of this criticism. For 
if criticism relies on a certain rationality that is well embedded in the organization, it may, 
after all, not be at all ‘critical’ to the status quo but rather serve to reproduce existing habits of 
thought and action. Of course, such a conservation of the status quo may often be just what is 
intended with a critical practice. The question, however, is whether such a practice at some 
point becomes ceremonial, i.e. whether criticism is exercised for the sake of criticism rather 
than for a justified reason. 
 
Forms of criticism: A typology 
In practice, the degree of coupling between criticism and organizational practices will assume 
different positions on a continuum. Theoretically, it is more useful to abstract from continuous 
space by making a distinction between three ‘ideal-types’ of criticism which enable us to 
develop a helpful heuristic device for analysis.  
 
< Insert Table 1 about here > 
 
First, we can identify a form of criticism that is only loosely coupled to organizational 
practices and established rationalities. In this case, we speak of discrete or idiosyncratic 
actions through which criticism is raised. These actions are not driven primarily by 
organizational practices and those actors issuing criticism do not act from their specific 
institutional background. An important type of such criticism is internal criticism, which 
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focuses on inconsistencies within other actors’ actions or argumentations. Such ‘criticism of 
inconsistencies and problems can flow in all directions’, as the logical resources for such 
criticism are usually available to all members of the organization (Kemp 2003:  80). Thus, the 
particular claim made by the critic is not a routine enactment of a specific rationality. But 
loose coupling may also exist in the case of external criticism, which is based on different 
values or understandings of the world. Here, established organizational rationalities may be 
less important than the rather spontaneous feeling that something should be done differently. 
Such a spontaneous reaction to a particular situation builds upon the creativity and 
responsiveness of the actor. The imaginative and evaluative dimensions of action loom large 
in such a form of criticism, while the iterative or routine dimension scores low (Emirbayer 
and Mische 1998). Criticism emerges from the responsive relation which organizational 
members have each to the other. In this sense, it is part of the ‘moment-by-moment versatility, 
flexibility, and negotiability’ that is characteristic of organizational life more generally 
(Shotter 2005: 129). 
Second, criticism often arises out of a clash of rationalities within the organization, 
much as Boltanski and Thévenot (1991, 1999) argue will occur in everyday situations. Cohen 
et al. (1972) account for this tendency with their garbage can model, according to which 
different rationalities, premised on different forms of knowledge, collide in their definition of 
problems in terms of the solutions that each finds normal. Ezzamel and Burns (2005) provide 
an illustration of confrontation between competing rationalities. In their case study of a UK 
retailer, the organization’s purchasing managers opposed a new financial control system 
introduced by finance staff. They built upon their ‘perceived sense of centrality, power, and 
professional superiority’ (2005: 770) and maligned the new system as an ‘alien’ concept 
(2005: 768) which conflicted with the ‘tried and trusted’ status quo (2005: 770). The 
discussions between purchasing and finance managers in this case show how ‘[d]iscourses 
produced and circulated by professional groups create truth-like qualities that define the 
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“entry points” with which they engage in professional competition’ (2005: 757). Importantly, 
such competing organizational rationalities may be linked to competing logics that are of 
wider institutional relevance. For example, in his recent study on the mutual funds industry in 
the U.S., Lounsbury (2007) showed how the behaviour of Boston-based and New York-based 
mutual funds was influenced by the competition of two logics of fund management, the 
trustee logic and the performance logic. The co-existence of these logics allowed for practice 
variation among mutual funds, some of which established contracts with professional money 
management firms on the basis of efficiency considerations (trustee logic), while others did so 
mainly on the basis of performance considerations. Although Lounsbury focuses on the 
dynamics of the organizational field, one can easily imagine that such a competition of 
rationalities may lead to competing positions also within an organization, before one of the 
logics finally prevails over the other or they are institutionally separated – as when Accenture 
split from Andersen Consulting in 1989 
(http://www.accenture.com/Global/About_Accenture/Company_Overview/History/Accenture
Leader.htm) . 
Criticism can happen because of potentially conflicting rationalities among different 
practices. A recurrent pattern results from the actual interdependencies of practices that is 
independent of the privileges of the social actors involved. Without both a conflict of interest 
and some point of contact this kind of criticism is unlikely to take place. When the underlying 
organizational practices have been institutionalized for a longer period of time and then, 
latterly, come into conflict with each other, criticism will tend to occur more often. However, 
since criticisms will disrupt existing routines they will be the exemption rather than the rule, 
and will, of necessity, be ‘transitory because they break the ordinary course of action’ 
(Boltanski and Thévenot 1999: 360).  
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Third, criticism may be even more tightly coupled to an organizational practice. 
Where a critical attitude is exercised in an organizationally systematic form, residing in a 
particular rationality defined by rules and resources, which are enacted in its practice, it 
differs from the critical attitude that might arise from a clash of rationalities. It forms a meta-
practice in which criticism is routinely exercised, referring not only to the content and 
motivation of criticism, and thus to the interpretative and normative rules enacted but also to 
the social actors involved and the corresponding time horizon. The critical actors are able to 
criticize with impunity because they occupy a unique structural position in relation to the 
organization. In addition, they are usually contracted with a very specific brief to review 
certain practices, processes and structures.  
Some examples may suffice to make these abstractions more concrete. First, wi thin the 
practice of human resource management, criticism will often be a routine component of 
personnel appraisals and evaluations. For instance, Townley et al. (2003) have analyzed the 
introduction of performance measurement in a public institution. As they argue, performance 
measurement is linked to the rationalization of organization (2003: 1045). Interestingly, 
Townley et al.’s (2003: 1065) observations ‘of how formal systems and templates for 
performance measurement were introduced [in the organization] shows how an instrumental 
reasoning came to dominate reasoned justification and communicative action.’ In this case the 
critical aspect of performance review introduced to the organization triggered change in other 
parts of the organization, ‘inculcat[ing] an instrumental rationalization that depersonalizes 
social relationships and extends technically rational control over social processes.’ (2003: 
1056). As this example shows, particular acts of criticism may be tightly coupled to the 
underlying practice of evaluation. First, there are the criteria for evaluation, which are usually 
formally established and linked to the goals of the organization, business unit, or individual 
person. Thus, the rules of signification and legitimation (Giddens 1984) applied in the 
exercise of criticism are directly related to the intended functionality of the practice, to ensure 
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that employees act in conformity with certain established standards. Second, to raise criticism 
during personnel evaluations is usually the privilege of a certain group of people, either 
people from the personnel department or superior managers. In both cases, the privilege to 
criticize is granted by formal means, such as job descriptions or department functions. As a 
result, there are certain persons who are responsible for exercising criticism. Third, this form 
of criticism is normally maintained over a longer period of time, establishing critical practice 
as normal within the organization.  
Quality control is a second example: typically, quality control practices are 
specifically designed to be critical towards other organizational practices such as production 
or customer service (Tuckman 1994; Lillrank 2003). In this sense quality control is a meta-
practice in which criticism is routinely exercised. Importantly, critical practices such as 
quality management or HR management may be institutionalized to different degrees. 
Therefore, they do not necessarily function as a meta-practice. As the examples in table 1 
show, human resource management often takes place in a rather informal and hardly 
routinized way, such as when managers give situational feedback to their employees and 
peers without resorting to the official procedures designed for appraisals.  
While performance criteria will be quite fixed and non-debatable in some 
organizations, they might be more fluid in others (Bourguignon and Chiapello 2005). As a 
consequence, members in different organizations will have variable opportunities to give 
voice critically and to challenge established forms of ’critical performance’. The range of 
‘technologies of the self’ (Foucault 1988, 1997a) that employees can effectively apply to 
position themselves vis-à-vis the institutionalized forms of criticism will thus vary among 
organizations (Townley 1997). Furthermore, the degree of institutionalization may also vary 
with respect to the social actors involved. For instance, some organizations opt for peer 
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assessments with changing constellations in order to avoid too strong an institutionalization in 
the social dimension.  
The distinction between discrete acts of criticism, criticism linked to organizational 
practices, and critical meta-practices is designed to encourage inspection of the structural 
background of particular acts of criticism and understanding of why criticism occurs and by 
which rules and resources it is supported. As illustrated above, criticism might be motivated 
by either a clash of rationalities or an insufficient coordination between rationalities. 
Likewise, it may be motivated by a dominant rationality which is firmly institutionalised as a 
meta-practice. To study the mechanisms behind particular critical actions in detail is an 
important means for uncovering and problematizing established systems of power/knowledge.  
The typology encourages consideration of the ‘connections that can be identified 
between mechanisms of coercion and elements of knowledge’ applied in critical practices and 
thus the ‘interplay of relay and support developed between them, such that a given element of 
knowledge takes on the effects of power in a given system where it is allocated to a true, 
probable, uncertain or false element, such that a procedure of coercion acquires the very form 
and justifications of a rational, calculated, technically efficient element’ (Foucault 1997b: 50). 
The argument is not intended to define ‘true or false, founded or unfounded, real or illusory, 
scientific or ideological, legitimate or abusive’ (1997b: 50) forms of criticism, but to make 
transparent the power relations and types of knowledge that legitimate such definitions in 
organizations and institutional fields. 
 
The organization of criticism 
Besides human resource management and quality control, several other practices involve the 
routine exercise of criticism and in this sense function as critical meta-practices. Table 2 
provides a selection of such practices, showing their potentially ambiguous effects. It is 
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important to note that criticism can also become organized in practices which are not 
principally focused on economic rationalities, such as works committees or equal 
opportunities officers within the organization, or social movements in the organizational 
environment (see Schneiberg and Lounsbury, forthcoming). 
< Insert table 2 about here > 
Importantly, table 2 puts emphasis on the ambiguous effects that critical practices may 
bring about in the organization. A tight coupling of critical practices to particular rationalities 
and actors can result in a very effective state of constant vigilance and criticism. The 
institutionalization of personnel evaluation practices demonstrates the point. Each time a 
personnel decision is made, the rationalities of personnel evaluation come into play in a way 
that is discontinuous with previous decisions. A general rule is deployed, despite whatever 
basis ‘in reality’ the decision is made on. In any moderately bureaucratized organization 
‘accounting’ for such action is always an organizational accomplishment, such that, no matter 
what its underlying ‘real’ motive might be, the decision must be rationalized. Each case is a 
case in itself, with each and every employee notionally being considered on the basis of a 
formal and rational calculus applied to their achievements. Such decisions, when organized as 
a meta-practice, appear to be made in an ‘ordered’ way, deploying similar criteria in each 
case, demonstrating an overall ‘personnel strategy’. The ‘organization of criticism’ can prove 
very effective in ensuring a continuous and focused problematization of practice but it has a 
downside: in the case of performance appraisals, the effect of criticism cannot be determined 
a priori – while some people might take it as fruitful feedback, others might not. In the latter 
case they might feel de-motivated, resign psychologically, or even become aggressive to their 
managers or colleagues (Fedor et al. 2001; Ilgen and Davis 2000; Geddes and Konrad 2003). 
 Appraisals operate as mechanisms of power/knowledge (Foucault 1995), ‘rendering 
aspects of existence visible, calculable, and thus manageable’ (Townley 1993b: 235-6). 
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Ultimately, the power of an appraisal resides in its ability to govern people’s behaviour, a 
power not only related to the personal authority that the manager has over the employee 
(Findlay and Newton 1998) but which also originates from the authority of the knowledge 
claims that are being made within the appraisal process. Here, the ‘power of the Norm’ 
(Foucault 1995: 184) is at work, urging organizational members to commit themselves to 
what is considered normal and functional within the organization. Commitment to such 
knowledge might well help an employee break with dysfunctional behaviour and better 
manage his or her work in the future (see Grey 1994). But it may equally turn into a 
commitment to a set of standards and norms that is not subjected to critical reflection itself, 
such as the rhetoric associated with quality, the customer, and zero defects in quality 
management. 
When critical knowledge claims are institutionalized within the organization as a 
meta-practice they often appear to be uncontentious, especially where they are (implicitly) 
linked to the manifest power differentials between managers (those who appraise) and 
employees (those who are appraised). Some organizations introduce 360 degrees feedback to 
try and overcome these structural barriers and to normalize criticism as a practice, irrespective 
of claims to speak authoritatively that are lodged in the managerial hierarchy. The more 
criticism becomes a normal procedure of, and embedded in, hierarchical power, making it a 
taken-for-granted performance by elites within the organization, the more likely it is to 
degenerate into a form of institutionalized domination.  
To be more participatory criticism would need to be problematized with respect to the 
body of knowledge that fuels its criticism (Barker 1993). Criticism that is ‘organized’ by its 
reliance on a given system of thought produces visibility and ensures constant vigilance with 
respect to certain issues; at the same time, it runs the risk of routinely producing invisibility 
without being aware that it is doing so. Instead of raising the level of critique, critical meta-
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practices may turn into a form of detrimental self-discipline, fostering learning and change 
only within the limits of a given system of power/knowledge (Contu et al. 2003).  
 
Discussion 
The ambiguity of critical practices has been touched upon with respect to different 
organizational practices, as Table 2 demonstrates. Comparing the literatures, we can see not 
only that these practices share a critical impact on other practices; they also feature a similar 
ambiguity with respect to the quality of their criticism, as well as mechanisms which increase 
the probability that a detrimental form of criticism will go uncontested in the organization. 
With respect to ambiguous effects, two mechanisms are particularly noteworthy. First, 
when a certain way of seeing and evaluating becomes institutionalized, there is the risk that it 
becomes disembedded from the details of the operational tasks at hand. It then becomes 
‘abstract management’ at a distance, ‘based on aggregation’ rather than ‘local knowledge’ 
(Townley 2002: 564), as has been observed frequently in respect of accounting and 
performance measurement (Armstrong 2002; Townley 2002) as well as human resource and 
quality management (Skålén et al. 2005). Second, the danger of becoming disembedded is 
related to the motivations for promoting critical practice, which can be quite diverse. 
Organizations may want to foster self-criticism and thus establish institutions that have the 
formal right and responsibility to issue such criticism.  
Not all critical practices will be established for the sake of criticism in the first place. 
Institutional rationality (Meyer and Rowan 1977), isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983), 
management fashion (Abrahamson 1996) and other external pressures may act as fundamental 
drivers for the adoption of these practices (Slack and Hinings 1994). If this is the case, critical 
practices become relatively disconnected from routine organizational concerns and are thus 
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seen as largely ceremonial by those subjected to them. The supposedly critical practice of 
auditing institutionalized at Enron (Sims and Brinkmann 2003), or the practice of internal 
auditing at Barings’ Bank (Stein 2000), for example, were farcically ceremonial. The actors 
involved, who, as auditors, were supposedly routine practitioners of critique, suspended their 
critical ability, presenting a mere façade of judgement apparently but not really conforming to 
external pressure (Meyer and Rowan 1977; see Power 1997). By contrast, a practice originally 
adopted for ceremonial reasons may become critical (in the double meaning of this word!) 
because of the way in which it is enacted in the organization. For instance, TQM may start as 
mere rhetoric without much practical impact, but, over time, assume a critical role and 
become part of the organizational habitus (Mueller and Carter 2005).  
One example of a practice originally adopted for ceremonial reasons becoming critical 
can be found in Lounsbury’s (2001) study on the diffusion of recycling in US Colleges and 
Universities. Recycling was diffused across education institutions in different ways. In most 
schools recycling programs were staffed through role accretion and seemed to be adopted 
more ceremoniously (Lounsbury, 2001: 50; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). When staffed with full 
time and committed employees recycling programs were adopted more substantially. When a 
social movement, the Student Environmental Action Movement, actively criticised existing 
waste management practices in organizations, more substantial responses were more 
common. Criticism by a social movement was the key driver institutionalizing a new practice. 
Hence, social movements can play an important role in the institutionalisation of critical 
practices (see also Schneiberg and Lounsbury, forthcoming). 
As Foucault (1995) has shown, power effects are not necessarily causally linked to 
initial practices and intentions. In giving certain institutions the authority to criticize 
according to clearly specified criteria, management can – intentionally or not – promote 
certain forms of criticism while simultaneously forestalling others not thus empowered. 
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Establishing critical practices can promote an organizational culture in which criticism is 
supposed to be channelled authoritatively rather than coming from everywhere. In such cases 
‘spontaneous’ criticism may not emerge because critique is already channelled and ‘managed’ 
to such an extent that organizational members who are not ‘expert critics’ neither feel 
sufficiently empowered nor willing to take a critical stance. The heterogeneity of critique 
reduces and leads to a state where critical meta-practices remain ‘beyond the reach of 
questioning or justification’ (Gomez and Jones 2000: 699) and become an ‘unquestioned (and 
unquestionable) way of doing things’ (Burns and Scapens 2000: 11).  
The literature is replete with examples. Perhaps the best can be drawn from the quality 
movement, an initially highly critical activity oriented to minimization of defective 
production, but with the unanticipated effect that ‘[t]otal quality stops people from thinking’, 
as W. Edwards Deming once said (Senge 1999: 34; see Zbaracki 1998). TQM is linked to the 
‘production of employees of a certain sort’ that the use of TQM language promotes (Kelemen 
2000: 492), and while the effects may initially be critical, as they are institutionalized they 
become a conservative template.  
The particular rhetoric that often surrounds a critical meta-practice may amplify its 
uncritical acceptance. Where management accountants are regarded as ‘change agents’ (see 
Granlund and Lukka 1998), when consultants are praised (and feared) for ‘exposing their 
client’s weaknesses’ (Sorge and van Witteloostuijn 2004: 1207), and auditors are associated 
with the search for fraud (see Power 1997), then the ‘rhetoric of critique’ becomes a matter of 
impression management: what could be more critical than the deployment of such critical 
expertise? Indeed, if organization members try to be more critical by opposing what the 
experts say, their behaviour is usually considered to be resistance to change rather than a case 




In this essay, we have made a case for thinking about critique not only in terms of an 
exceptional action that not only ‘opens up’ organizational practice and discourse but that may 
also ‘close down’ such phenomena. That knowledge is good and critique is better, as the 
saying goes, is not necessarily confirmed in mundane organizational practice.  
For scholars, research conceptions of critique often equate it with critical reflection 
institutionalized in scholarly work rather than studying it in its practical and institutional 
embeddedness. An increased awareness of the links between criticism and organizational 
practices may help overcome the one-sided picture that often surrounds writings on critique 
and acknowledge that even where a practice begins as critical, in the sense of ‘opening up 
understanding or facilitating reflection’, it might ‘end up locking people into fixed, 
unreflexive thinking’ (Alvesson and Willmott 1996: 175).  
A focus on the ‘organisation of criticism’ can also be seen in light of some recent work 
that tries to combine insights from practice theory and institutional theory in order to get a 
better understanding of how practices can challenge other practices, compete with them, and 
replace them as dominant practices over time (see Lounsbury and Crumley, forthcoming). In 
such a setting, one may observe particular critical practices, analyse the rules and resources 
they draw upon as their ‘deep structure’, and study their impact and dissemination throughout 
the organization or institutional field. Forms of criticism which, in the first place, emerge 
outside organisations, such as the critical discourses of social movements, can become 
organizationally relevant once they are enacted in organizational practice (see Lounsbury, 
2001). In recent times, the feminist and green movements are successful examples of social 
movements that have translated critique into institutionalized stake holding through measures 
such as EEO and environmental and carbon footprint audits. Thus, a concern with critical 
practices need not be confined to forms of criticism that aim at making organizations more 
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profitable and efficient. A concern with critical practices may not only help organizations to 
learn, unlearn, and change but may also trigger a more encompassing rethinking of the 
rationalities and power relations that dominate contemporary organizations and institutional 
fields and thus shape ‘the society of organizations’ (Perrow 1991) in which we live.  
Something of that sort seems to be in play at present with the emergence of issues concerning 
organizations’ carbon footprint having moved discursively from the arena of committed 
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 General characteristics Examples 
Discrete 
criticism  
 Criticism is not based on specific 
organizational practices or meta-practices, but 
on a rationality which is not that prominently 
institutionalized within the organization.  
 The critical actor does not act out of his or her 
specific institutional background. Thus, all 
actors can potentially raise this kind of 
criticism.  
 There is no routinization, since a permanent 
state of discrete criticism would question the 
very idea of organizing.  
 These are ad hoc criticisms 
that might arise in any 
context, from a specific and 
idiosyncratic reflection on a 
given practice by an actor. 
 In the case of human resource 
management, an example 
would be the situation-specific 
criticism of an employee’s 





 Content and motivation of criticism are related 
to the logic of the corresponding practice. 
Criticism is mainly fuelled by conflict with 
some other practice or action.  
 Both the critics and the actors being criticised 
can vary from occasion to occasion. However, 
the constellation will usually be influenced by 
how practices relate to and depend on each 
other.  
 While organizational practices are usually 
established for a longer period of time, 
criticism will arise punctually and disrupt the 
established routines. 
 Criticism depends on 
contingent rationalities and 
agendas. Certain agendas 
bring together certain 
opposing points of view 
operating from different 
rationalities.  
 In the case of human resource 
management, there could be a 
conflict between the HR 
department and an operational 
department regarding the need 
of personnel development. 
Critical meta-
practice 
 Criticism of certain, rather well-defined issues 
is a routine part of these practices. Criteria for 
criticism are often fixed and formalized. 
 Certain actors are responsible for carrying out 
the meta-practice. They might thus be regarded 
as the (expert) critics. 
 The meta-practice is usually institutionalized 
for a longer period of time. It is an established 
part of the organization. 
 Bringing in consultants to 
review practices; using 
auditors to review and advise 
on practices; instituting 
internal critical practices, such 
as ethics committees or equal 
opportunity officers.  
 Human resource management 
often comprises routines for 
evaluation and appraisal, 
based upon well-defined 
performance criteria. 



















Human resource management may facilitate knowledge 
production (Lengnick-Hall and Lengnick-Hall 2006), promote 
beneficial organizational change (Kochan and Dyer 1993), and 
help employees better manage their career (Grey 1994). At the 
same time, HRM practices often fulfill a disciplining and 
normalizing role (Townley 1993a, 1993b, 1997, 1998; Townley 
et al, 2003), producing conformist identities (Alvesson and 
Willmott 2002) and thereby impeding creativity and ad-hoc 








While TQM may be an alternative to management by control 
(Price 1989) and lead to empowerment, heightened responsibility 
and commitment of employees, it may also reinforce bureaucratic 
control (Mueller and Carter 2005) and restrict critical debate 
about organizational goals (Webb 1996; Wilkinson and Willmott 
1995). Moreover, quality management concepts have been 
criticized for often being too abstract in nature to be sensibly 
adapted by organizational members at the local level (Skålén et 
al. 2005; Townley 2002). Finally, scholars have put emphasis on 
the ambiguity of TQM processes (eg Edwards et al, 1998; 





financial viability of 
investment projects  
Management accountants may well act as change agents in their 
organizations (Granlund and Lukka 1998; Burns and 
Baldvinsdottir 2005) and critically challenge established mindsets 
of managers (Becker and Messner 2005). But strongly 
institutionalized accounting practices may at the same time 
degenerate into a ceremonial practice (Siti-Nabiha and Scapens 
2005), disciplining organizational members (Hopper and 







Consultants can open up a ‘liminal space’ for the organization 
(Czarniawska and Mazza 2003) and by that introduce noise that 
will help overcome organizational lock-ins (Clegg et al. 2004). 
However, consulting projects often conform with the political 
interest of top management (Sturdy et al. 2004; see Clark and 
Fincham 2002) and are based on a particular rhetoric that is more 
about persuasion than problem-solving (Berglund and Werr 








Auditing and internal control are major means to ensure 
compliance with standards. However, there is an increasing gap 
between expectations and reality of audits, and the latter are often 
rendered ceremonial (Power 1997). Prominent examples of 
internal controls degenerating into a farce are those of Enron 
(Sims and Brinkmann 2003) and Barings’ Bank (Stein 2000). On 
the other hand, control may turn into a neurotic practice when 
anxieties amplify as reasons for anxiety diminish (Foley et al. 
2005). 
Table 2: Selected critical meta-practices and their ambiguous effects 
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